Linux Security Primer

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Outline: User Security

1. Security what?
2. Password Selection
3. Storage of Sensitive Data
4. Spam, Phishing, Viruses and other beasts
Outline: Network Security

13 Host-based Firewall

14 SSH

15 Private Networks

16 Resources
A Word of Wisdom

«There is a ton of evidence both in computing and outside of it which shows that poor security can be very much worse than no security at all. In particular stuff which makes users think they are secure but is worthless is very dangerous indeed.»

Alan Cox
Linux Kernel mailing list
October 25th, 2007
Part I

Introduction and User Security
What do we need to protect from?

- automated attacks
- targeted attacks
- insiders
- errors
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What do we need to protect?

Short answer: everything.

- machines that operate on valuable data
- machines that are in any way connected and can be used to later attack other machines that operate on valuable data
- any other machine
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Have a Strong Password

OK, everybody heard this one more times than there are stars in the sky... and everyday machines are compromised using ‘admin’ as a password to login as root.

- the name of your cat is not a good password
- the incredibly long and difficult password you use for your free email account is not a good root password
- using cracklib is good
- running John the Ripper over your own password file now and then is good
- using different means of authentication is even better
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Know How Data Are Saved

- a central shared storage system is easy to backup and easy to protect
- workstation-local storage is much harder to backup and protect
- a mixed solution has the worst parts of both
Backups are as valuable as live data

- backups should be protected at least as much as live data
- backup protection is quite different from live data protection
- keep backups offline and they are safe from online attacks
- don’t keep backup media (be it CD, tapes, external disks) where they can be stolen or copied
Online threats

- Unsolicited Bulk Email a.k.a. «spam»
- «phishing» and related malicious activities can be both «generic», easier to detect and block, and targeted to you / your organization, much more dangerous
- downloaded viruses and other malware, ranging from half-innocent adware, to keyloggers, to nasty bots, to rootkits
Spam

- more than a half of email messages are spam
- this is at best a huge resource waste

There is no definitive solution, however several partial ones are available:

- blacklist-based rejection at the mail gateway
- pattern matching over message content
- bayesian filters

They can of course be combined together for increased effectiveness.
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Anti-Spam Solutions

Blacklists

• easy to set up
• fast if applied at the first gateway
  • lists need to be continuously updated (at least daily, maybe hourly)
• high risk of false positives if you expect to receive mail from Third World countries, or from users connected through sloppy ISPs
• may depend on external resources
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- can be tuned to balance risk of false positives against effectiveness
- easy to customize with site-specific rules
  - very CPU- and memory-intensive
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Bayesian Filters

- very easy to customize for each user
- automatically updates itself, following evolving spam patterns
- user interaction required
- CPU- and memory-intensive, requires access to storage for token database
- long start-up time, requires several thousands known good and bad messages to be effective
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Mail-based phishing can be treated as spam, and in fact a large fraction of spam is phishing-related. This however doesn’t work for

- **targeted** phishing, i.e. messages forged especially for you or your organization
- phishing that is not mail-based, e.g. using instant messengers, VoIP, blogs, web-based forums

The only real solution is user education: make people aware of the threat and make them able to recognize forged messages of whatever origin.
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Viruses and Downloaded Malware

Once upon a time Linux was considered virus-free. This is not the case any more.

Sure, ActiveX do not run under Linux, and most malware one can be infected by surfing the web is specific to that other Operating System. Still vulnerabilities have been found for every single Linux application and (rarely) for the Linux kernel itself.
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A Linux infection path is typically:

- malicious user gets unprivileged shell access through a **vulnerable exposed application** (e.g. a mail server)
- the attacker operates a **local privilege escalation** exploiting some other vulnerable application or the kernel itself
- once the attacker has root privileges, he installs a **rootkit** that somehow patches the running kernel, completely hiding malicious activities (i.e. involved files, processes and network connections become invisible even to the legitimate privileged user)

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Part II

Host Security
Keep Your Systems Updated

Every day a new vulnerability is discovered.
Not all of these may be critical to your systems, however you should think before deciding not to apply a provided patch – and you should as well think before you do apply it:

- what is the patch about?
- is the vulnerability critical to the affected software? is it critical in your environment?
- what could be the consequences of not applying the patch? (think worst case)
- can you foresee any collateral damage?
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Do You Trust Your Update Servers?

Vulnerability discovered, patch released, system updated. Now you think you are safe... think better!

- have you tested patches before applying? this takes time and effort
- do you trust update servers? (assuming that you at least trust the vendor)
  update servers probably use the same operating system as yours:
  what if they had been hacked and rogue patches added?
- do you trust DNS?
  if you pull updates from a rogue server you could install rootkits instead of patches
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  - enable signature checking if you use an auto-update service
  - manually verify signatures if you manually update
  - downloading both a package and the public key needed for signature verification from the same server at the same time is useless
- protect your keyring
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**e.g.:** HPC cluster with a lot of custom software:

- kernel upgrade would force network drivers recompilation and/or upgrade
- network drivers recompilation would force middleware recompilation and/or upgrade
- middleware recompilation would force recompilation of all user application
- half of them would not work any more...
What if You Cannot Patch?

- a patch might not be available
- collateral damage might be unacceptable
- find workarounds if possible
- have multiple layers of security around the vulnerable component
- check often for signs of compromise
- strictly control access
Protect Your Bootloader

- If a machine is not locked in a server room chances are that ordinary, untrusted users can reboot it.
- If they can select an alternate boot device they could just install the OS of their choice.
- If they have access to the boot loader command line they could start the installed operating system in some «maintenance» mode with most security features disabled.
  - Just add `init=/bin/sh` to a linux kernel command line and you get a root shell and no logs.
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Avoid Dual-Boot

If a machine can boot different OSes there is no practical way you can protect data belonging to one OS only from the other. If one of the installed OSes is compromised, you have to consider the whole machine compromised.

Consider using some virtualization technology if you really need to have multiple OSes available at the same station.
If you have a «main» OS and one or more «secondary» ones that are rarely used, you can go with a in-OS virtual machine, e.g. VMware or Qemu.
If several OSes are used and none can be considered the main one, go for a hypervisor solution, e.g. Xen. Modern x86 hardware can run many unmodified OSes under a hypervisor.
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Check Filesystem Permissions

- give everyone permissions they need
- don’t give them anything more

So:

- check that permissions are what they should be after initial installation and after patching
- look for setuid/setgid executables
- look for world writable directories
- look for world readable configuration files

(Wait before you `chmod 600 /etc`! Most configuration files have to be world readable. Some of them however really need to be readable only by root.)
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Use Filesystem Permissions Wisely

- do not create unneeded world writable directories
- set the «sticky bit» (\texttt{chmod +t}) on world writable directories (/\texttt{tmp} should be already there, and should be enough)
- world writable directories are happier in a filesystem of their own; you will be happier if you do not depend on that filesystem availability — think local DoS
- groups can be used to share files among users; have a different group for each project/office
  (the default behavior of some RedHat-derived distros to have a different group for each user makes groups completely useless)
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Some filesystem permissions can be completely disabled at mount time:

- `ro` read-only
- `noexec` disables execution of any binary on the filesystem (this actually works only with kernel 2.6.x and 2.4.25 or later)
- `nosuid` makes the setuid and setgid bits ineffective
- `nodev` do not allow character or block devices on the filesystem
Disable Services You don’t Need

The average modern Linux distro has somewhere between 50 and 100 available services. Maybe half of them are enabled after a default install.

- Do you really need so many active services?
- Do you really need them installed at all?
- Do you know what all those services are?
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A typical «server» install has

- a web server, e.g. Apache, thttpd
- a mail server, e.g. Postfix, Sendmail
- a print server, e.g. CUPS
- NFS server and/or Samba
- xinetd
- sshd

You probably want SSH, but if you are installing a DHCP server or a caching web proxy you don’t need any of the others!
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A typical «workstation» or «laptop» install has

- DHCP client, PPP tools and other «home» connectivity sw
- wireless connectivity tools
- X11 and some fancy graphical desktop environment
- a truckload of games and desktop gadgets
- multimedia tools
- autoeverything-wonderfilesystem, up to and including the dreadful automatic execution on CD/DVD insertion

Again, you probably need a graphical environment, but if this is going to be a software development workstation, or a central point of control for your network...?
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Protect Services You Need

- restrict access to services from network
e.g. a NFS server probably doesn’t need to be accessed from outside your LAN
- enable and configure authentication where appropriate
- don’t mix internal end external services
e.g. the database that powers your dynamic web pages should be not the same used by your accounting office
- make servers «know» what is your trusted network and what is not
e.g. your DNS should answer queries about internal, protected machines only if queries come from internal network
Password Aging

User accounts and passwords should expire automatically
  • this reduces risk of having valid accounts for people that are not part of the organization any more
  • can be used to force users to change password often
  • can help in monitoring which users are active regularly
    a change in this pattern is usually something interesting to spot
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Limit User Access per-System

User access should be limited to systems where it is actually needed.

If you use local accounts (unrecommended...) you simply need to create accounts only where they are needed.

If you have some central account management service, you probably want to limit which accounts are enabled on each and every machine, and where users can login from.

All of this can be done in the /etc/security/access.conf configuration file.
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Sample /etc/security/access.conf

+ALL:ALL

  allow (+) everybody (1st ALL) from everywhere (2nd ALL)
Limit User Access per-System /2

Sample /etc/security/access.conf

-:ALL EXCEPT root:ALL

allow only root
Limit User Access per-System /2

Sample /etc/security/access.conf

-:ALL EXCEPT root:LOCAL

disallow local login to everybody except root
Limit User Access per-System /2

Sample /etc/security/access.conf

-:ALL EXCEPT root:LOCAL
+:ALL: .mydomain.net
-:ALL:ALL

*access is granted or denied based on the first matching line*

*so here we allow only root on the local console, everybody from the mydomain.net domain and nobody else*
Limit User Access per-Service

Limit user access only to services actually needed:

• users who don’t have to manage web pages do not need shell access to the web server
  (and even them who do have to manage web pages can probably do so without direct access to the web server machine itself)

• nobody but mail administrators need shell access to mail servers

• the same goes for directory servers, network management boxes, shared storage, proxy servers...
Every now and then you will need some dummy account to perform some test on a pre-production machine or service. Be extra careful when creating these accounts otherwise...

- you will probably create a test account with username `test`
- you will probably set its password to «test1»
- you will probably use the account for a couple of days, then forget about it
- you will probably complete all tests on the machine, then put it in a production (i.e. hostile) environment with the test account still enabled

**THIS IS VERY BAD!**
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**THIS IS VERY BAD!**
Don’t Use root When Not Needed

Use the privileged account only when really needed.

- **never** use root account to surf the web or read email
- take extra care when you are root: a `–r` after `rm` can be a typo for the regular user, a disaster for root
- most software can be compiled and installed as a regular user after root has created the destination path; if not, then the installation procedure is trying to do something strange (at best) and needs to be investigated
Regular users should not get privileged access.

- you should arrange so that no privileged operations are needed for regular user work (e.g. all needed software is already installed on workstations, no configuration changes are needed, etc.)
- if for some special need a regular user needs to execute some privileged operation, use **sudo**

**sudo** allows a regular user to perform certain actions with elevated privileges; this must be configured by the superuser and should be done with extreme care.

Keep in mind that allowing a random user to do **sudo bash** is the same as setting the empty password for root! (and allowing arbitrary package installation is more or less the same)
Watch Your Logs

Keeping an eye on logs is one of the most effective ways to detect intrusion attempts and ongoing attacks: if you know your system well enough, and you know typical log patterns, you will easily spot any difference from previous days.

Most Linux distros have some simple built-in log analysis tool (e.g. logwatch, logdigest, epylog) that can produce nicely formatted reports and email them to you. Reading and understanding those reports should be the first morning duty of every security conscious sysadmin (and user who has admin privileges on his own workstation).
Remote Log Storage

Once a machine has been compromised you cannot trust its logs any more: if the attacker has been able to change system files, he could have changed (or simply deleted) local logs as well. This makes log analysis useless, unless log files are stored on some different machine.

Traditional syslog uses the @hostname syntax to specify that a log should be sent to some other host instead of written to a local file.

Newer syslog-ng uses the tcp ("address" port(number)) syntax in the destination statement.

Beware however that even if remotely-stored logs are safe from deletion and modification, they can still be poisoned with fake messages that make the interesting events more difficult to find and analyze.
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The **Advanced Intrusion Detection Environment** is an intrusion detection system that checks file integrity.

- you should start with a known-clean system
- a crypto-safe checksum is computed for every file and saved to a database along with file metadata
- the whole database is cryptographically signed and stored to some safe place, e.g. read-only media
- when checking your system, you recompute checksums and metadata and compare with those saved in the database
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chkrootkit is basically a collection of shell scripts plus a few binaries that locally check for signs of well-known rootkits. Since it is script-based, it depends on several system utilities, so it is best to provide those from external, read-only media if you suspect that the system has been somehow modified.

chkrootkit is likely to report some false positive (many perl packages are detected as suspect), and it is not guaranteed to detect every possible malware piece, but it is very fast and easy to run, so it is a good starting point.
System hardening is not about patching specific vulnerabilities or about configuring a system where no compromise can occur. Rather, it is about making existing vulnerabilities more difficult to exploit, and about making it difficult for the attacker to get any real advantage from an exploited vulnerability.

e.g.: there might be a vulnerability in our web software we don’t know about that allows an attacker to execute a shell by sending a carefully crafted HTTP request. If we do not allow /bin/sh to be a child of the web server process, the vulnerability is still there, but cannot be effectively exploited.
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The grsecurity Kernel

grsecurity is a kernel patch that

- allows you to define fine-grained ACL on files and processes
- detects abnormal process behavior (e.g. «too many» segmentation violations) and optionally disables execution of offending processes
- enforces memory protection, disabling execution of any page that has been writable in a process’ history
- randomizes address space of processes and PIDs; configures larger than default entropy pools
- hides most processes and large parts of the /proc filesystem from unprivileged users
Installing and configuring grsecurity

- only few distros include a grsecurity-enabled kernel; you need to download the patch from grsecurity.net and patch a vanilla kernel
- address space protection, /proc protection and randomization features must be configured in the kernel itself; most of them can be enabled at runtime via sysctl
- ACLs must be stored in a configuration file and loaded at runtime
- a few userspace utilities are provided, but are not strictly needed
Security-Enhanced Linux is part of modern vanilla kernel and is included in most distros and is most often part of any default installation.

- basically a large set of ACLs on all filesystem objects
- ACLs are stored in filesystem metadata and can be enabled at runtime
- most filesystem utilities need to be made SELinux-aware
AppArmor

Apparmor is a different implementation of ACLs.

- installed with several distros (openSUSE, Ubuntu)
- ACLs are stored in configuration files
- ACLs apply only to specified «objects», so unconfigured applications have no policy
## grsecurity vs SELinux

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>grsecurity</strong></th>
<th><strong>SELinux</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>ACLs only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>small user base, you need to write your own ACLs</td>
<td>large user base, ACLs preconfigured in many distros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>configuration stored in plain text files, easy to copy and backup</td>
<td>configuration in FS metadata, SELinux-enabled utilities needed to copy and backup</td>
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# SELinux vs AppArmor

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<td>ACLs apply to whole system</td>
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</table>
Virtualization for Increased Security

Virtualization technologies have been developed to allow multiple OS instances to run concurrently on the same hardware. They can as well be used to enforce resource separation where having separate real hardware would be too expensive.

Linux-friendly virtualization technologies include:

- Linux VServer
- Xen
- VMware
Virtualization with VServer

Linux VServer is a very lightweight kernel patch that provides virtual environments at the userspace level.

- a single Linux kernel runs on real hardware
- different userspace environments can be completely different Linux installation (even different distros) or can be clones of a single base
- very easy to detect that you are running in a virtual environment
- good separation at the process level
- no separation at all at the kernel level
- kernel modification needed; only Linux available
Virtualization with Xen

Xen is a hypervisor that can run both unmodified OSes and paravirtualized OSes.

- paravirtualization available only with Linux and certain *BSD
- full virtualization can run almost any OS, but requires hardware support and has higher overhead
- can run completely different OSes concurrently, but multiple kernels means also larger memory footprint
Virtualization with VMware

VMware is actually a family of (commercial) products, some of which are available at no cost. A VMware virtual machine provides full hardware emulation (you even have a virtual BIOS).

- can run any unmodified OS
- excellent separation among well-behaved OSes
- special instructions are available to guest OS to communicate to the virtualization software itself
Part III

Network Security
Netfilter overview

In modern (2.6) Linux kernel the IP filtering facility is set up, maintained and inspected by means of the `iptables` command. Several different tables may be defined. Each table contains a number of built-in chains and optional user-defined chains.

Each chain is a list of rules which can match a set of packets. Each rule specifies what to do with a packet that matches. This is called a «target», which may be

- a jump to a user-defined chain in the same table
- a terminating target that makes the packet exit the table, being either dropped, forwarded, or allowed to enter or exit the machine
- a non-terminating target that may perform some action while making the packet continue rule traversal
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Netfilter overview /2

The **filter** table contains the built-in chains **INPUT** (for packets destined to local sockets), **FORWARD** (for packets being routed through the box), and **OUTPUT** (for locally-generated packets).

The **nat** table is consulted when a packet that creates a new connection is encountered. It contains the built-ins **PREROUTING** (for altering packets as soon as they come in), **OUTPUT** (for altering locally-generated packets before routing), and **POSTROUTING** (for altering packets as they are about to go out). It can change source and destination addresses and ports for each connection.

The **mangle** table is used for specialized packet alteration.
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The **mangle** table is used for specialized packet alteration.
The filter table

incoming packets

input
forward
output

local processes

outgoing packets
Common targets

**ACCEPT** let the packet through

**DROP** drop the packet on the floor

**REJECT** drop the packet (as in DROP) and send back an error packet

**RETURN** stop processing in this chain and return the packet to calling chain

**LOG** generate a klog message about the packet

**SNAT** modify source address of the packet; only valid in the POSTROUTING chain of the nat table

**DNAT** modify destination address of the packet; only valid in the PREROUTING and OUTPUT chains of the nat table

(…and many more)
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(...and many more)
Default targets

Built-in chains have a default target (or policy), i.e. a target that is applied if no rule in the chain matches.

When building a secure system is extremely useful to have DROP as default policy, so that everything is dropped unless explicitly allowed to pass. Just take care not to lock yourself out. . .
Netfilter configuration

Netfilter rules can be configured with the `iptables` command line utility one rule at a time or by feeding a rule file to `iptables-restore`.

Basic operations include:

- create, destroy or flush (empty) a user-defined chain
- set a default policy for a built-in chain
- appending or inserting in a specified place a new rule into an existing chain
- deleting or replacing an existing rule
- listing rules and counters and optionally zeroing counters
Rules can match packets by looking at:

- interface the packet is coming from or heading to
- protocol type
- source and destination IP addresses
- address type (unicast, multicast or broadcast)
- source and destination ports for TCP and UDP, or ICMP type
- TCP connection state and/or any combination of TCP flags
- an arbitrary tag («mark») assigned to a packet by a preceding rule

this allows state propagation inside the netfilter framework, but do not alter in any way the packet itself, so it is lost as soon as the packet is sent out to the network or passed to user space
Netfilter configuration examples

```
iptables -t filter -P INPUT DROP
«DROP everything as default policy for the INPUT chain in the filter table».
-t filter can be omitted, since filter is the default table.
```

```
iptables -A INPUT -i lo -j ACCEPT
«In the INPUT chain (of the filter table) ACCEPT (everything) coming from the loopback interface».
```

```
iptables -A INPUT -p icmp -m icmp --icmp-type echo-request -s ! 147.122.0.0/16 -j DROP
iptables -A INPUT -p icmp -j ACCEPT
«Load (-m) the ICMP matching extension; DROP pings from everywhere but (!) our class B network».
«ACCEPT (any other) ICMP packet».
```
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Netfilter configuration examples /2

```
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -m tcp -s 147.122.0.0/16 --dport 22 -syn -j ACCEPT
«ACCEPT SYN packets for SSH from our network».

iptables -A INPUT -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
«Load the TCP state matching module; ACCEPT any packet that is part of an already established connection». This includes SSH packets from connections allowed by the previous rule, but not arbitrary non-SYN packets.
```

Netfilter is fully stateful.
Netfilter configuration examples /2

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iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -m tcp -s 147.122.0.0/16 --dport 22 -syn -j ACCEPT
«ACCEPT SYN packets for SSH from our network».
```

```
iptables -A INPUT -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
«Load the TCP state matching module; ACCEPT any packet that is part of an already established connection».  
This includes SSH packets from connections allowed by the previous rule, but not arbitrary non-SYN packets.  
**Netfilter is fully stateful.**
```
Netfilter configuration examples /3

```
iptables -A inputs -p tcp -m tcp --dport 113 -j REJECT
iptables -A inputs -p udp -m udp --dport 113 -j REJECT
```

«REJECT all ident packets».
There are still servers on the net that make ident queries. Rejecting with an error packet these queries instead of just dropping them usually speeds up things, since we do not need to wait for a timeout to expire.
Netfilter configuration examples /4

```bash
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp -m tcp --syn -m limit
          --limit 5/minute -j LOG --log-level debug
          --log-prefix "iptables: "
```

«Load the TCP matching and rate limiting modules; log SYN packets, up to 5 per minute».
This could be the last rule of an INPUT chain with a default DROP policy: we log connection attempts just before dropping them, with an anti-DoS clause.
Packets that have already been ACCEPTed, DROPped or REJECTed never reach this rule.
Netfilter configuration saving and restoring

To save configuration across reboots and for efficient creation of a large number of rules netfilter provides the two commands `iptables-save` and `iptables-restore` that dump the running configuration to a plain text file and restore the configuration from the same (or possibly modified file).

In RedHat and derived distros the configuration file is usually `/etc/sysconfig/iptables`. 
Egress Filtering

A firewall is not only about protecting your host or network from what comes from outside, it can be also about filtering what tries to exit from your perimeter.
You may want to do egress filtering for at least two different reasons:

- control what people do with your computing resources, e.g. no peer-to-peer file sharing allowed
- make a whole class of attacks against your network ineffective, e.g. many bots need to connect to an IRC channel to perform their evil deeds
SSH is your Friend

SSH is probably the most useful utility you have when it comes to working on several machines at one time and/or from a remote location.

SSH provides you with

- an encrypted communication channel
- several user authentication methods
- host verification
- secure file transfer
- port redirection, encrypted and authenticated tunnels
SSH for login

calucci@yogi $ ssh shannon
calucci@shannon’s password:
calucci@shannon-01 $

In its simplest form `ssh` is just a replacement for older `telnet`. You connect to a remote host, give a password, and are presented a shell prompt.

Remote user name can be different from local using the `ssh -l user host` or `ssh user@host` syntax.
SSH for passwordless login

calucci@yogi $ ssh shannon
Enter passphrase for key
'/home/calucci/.ssh/id_dsa':
calucci@shannon-01 $

While all of this looks quite similar to password authentication there are very important differences:

- your password never leaves your local box so it is safe even if the remote box is compromised
- the same key can be used to authenticate to different remote machines and/or different remote users
- the passphrase you are asked for is used only to encrypt your private key and you can change it locally without any need to connect to remote machines the key is used to authenticate to
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  private key and you can change it locally without any need to
  connect to remote machines the key is used to authenticate to
Public Key Authentication with SSH

PK authentication works by giving proof to the remote machine that you actually own a private key. The remote machine has been instructed to allow login the user who owns the private key corresponding to a public key that has been remotely installed.

It is actually simpler than it sounds...

1. you create on the local machine a key pair:
   ```
   ssh-keygen -t dsa -b 1024
   ```
   you are asked for a passphrase to protect the key: enter something reasonably long yet easy to remember; **do not use any of your passwords!**
   the keys are saved in the .ssh directory as `id_dsa` (private key) and `id_dsa.pub` (public key)
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Public Key Authentication with SSH

2. you install your public key to the remote machine:
   `cat .ssh/id_dsa.pub | ssh shannon "cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys"
` 
   this assumes that your public key is `.ssh/id_dsa.pub` and that a `.ssh` directory exists in your home directory on the remote machine
   (more on this command line later)

3. now when trying to login to the remote host you are asked for the passphrase for your private key instead of your remote password
SSH can be made «more passwordless» than that using the `ssh-agent` to keep you private key available, so that you do not need to write your passphrase for every login, but only once per session.

If you are using a (decently configured) graphical environment, an ssh-agent is most probably already there, waiting for your input. On a text console you probably need to start it manually:

eval `ssh-agent`

this is some little shell magic: the agent starts and outputs a few lines of shell commands, the shell then evaluates («executes») these commands.
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```
eval `ssh-agent`
```
this is some little shell magic: the agent starts and outputs a few lines of shell commands, the shell then evaluates («executes») these commands.
Once the agent is started, you can start adding private keys:

```bash
ssh-add -t 4h
```

Enter passphrase for `/home/calucci/.ssh/id_dsa`:

Identity added: `/home/calucci/.ssh/id_dsa`

This adds your default key to the agent keyring, with a lifetime of 4 hours (it is always a good idea to specify a finite lifetime); you are prompted for your passphrase and from that point on you will no longer need it to connect to remote machines (configured to accept your key for authentication)
**SSH agent**

- `ssh-add` can list loaded keys:
  ```
  ssh-add -l
  1024 21:4b:....ssh/id_dsa (DSA)
  ```

- and remove keys from the keyring:
  ```
  ssh-add -D
  All identities removed.
  ```
**SSH agent** /3

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ssh-add -l
1024 21:4b:....ssh/id_dsa (DSA)
```

and remove keys from the keyring:

```bash
ssh-add -D
All identities removed.
```
SSH Host Verification

A frequently overlooked feature of SSH is host verification:

- every SSH-enabled host has a unique identification key
- this key is presented to the client at connection request
- the client checks the host key against a database of known hosts

The most common (and quite secure) behavior of an SSH client is

- continue the authentication procedure if the host is known and the key matches
- warn the user and ask for confirmation if the host is unknown
- warn the user and abort authentication if the host is known but the key has changed
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- warn the user and abort authentication if the host is known but the key has changed
A non-matching host key can be a sign of:

- a reinstalled remote host – nothing to worry about, just delete the offending key from your database (usually .ssh/known_hosts) and move on
- a compromised remote host with a trojan SSH
- a man-in-the-middle attack, with your packets being routed through a rogue host

...so don't overlook warnings about mismatched host keys.
SSH Host Verification /2

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…so don’t overlook warnings about mismatched host keys.
The SSH-based `scp` utility can do remote file copy over an encrypted channel, with all authentication features of SSH.

Local to remote:
```bash
scp path1/file user@host:path2/file
```

Remote to local:
```bash
scp user@host:path1/file path2/file
```

Remote to remote:
```bash
scp userA@host1:path/file userB@host2:path2/file
```

Here the connection goes from host1 to host2, so host verification and user authentication can be a bit tricky.
SSH for Secure File Copy

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**SSH for Secure File Copy /2**

`scp -r` copies recursively entire directories.

`scp -C` (de)compresses data on the fly. Whether this makes things faster depends on network bandwidth and available CPU power (on both sides).

`scp -l` can be used to limit used bandwidth. Quite useful if you have several connections open at the same time, or do not want to overload a slower machine.
The SSH-based *sftp* does FTP over an encrypted channel, with all authentication features of SSH. Most default FTP commands are supported and behave the usual way.

SFTP is much more NAT- and firewall-friendly than plain old FTP, since only the SSH port is involved: no multiple connections, no random ports.
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SFTP is much more NAT- and firewall-friendly than plain old FTP, since only the SSH port is involved: no multiple connections, no random ports.
SSH for remote batch operation

Once you have arranged for passwordless authentication, SSH allows you to execute arbitrary commands on a remote host non-interactively:

```
ssh root@cerbero df -h /scratch
```

Filesystem  Size  Used  Avail  Use%  Mounted on
iosrv:/scratch  933G  617G  317G  67%  /scratch

This is of course extremely useful for remote system administration. In a tightly controlled environment you can even generate a passphrase-less key and use it to perform fully automated remote administration.
SSH for remote batch operation

Once you have arranged for passwordless authentication, SSH allows you to execute arbitrary commands on a remote host non-interactively:

```
ssh root@cerbero df -h /scratch
```

Filesystem Size Used Avail Use% Mounted on
iosrv:/scratch 933G 617G 317G 67% /scratch

This is of course extremely useful for remote system administration. In a tightly controlled environment you can even generate a passphrase-less key and use it to perform fully automated remote administration.
SSH for remote batch operation /2

An extension of the authorized_keys file allows you to enable certain keys to execute only defined commands – this is the ultimate SSH-based solution for remote administration automation:

if you have in authorized_keys
command=="/bin/df -h" ssh-dss AAAAB3N...
when using the corresponding key to authenticate you are allowed to run only df -h (actually this is done for you by the SSH daemon).

Warning: at least some versions of OpenSSH will offer all the available keys for authentication, so if you have multiple keys configured for a single host, and have all of them loaded by the agent (or passphrase-less) you may end up using the «wrong» key. Better have all the keys passphrase-protected and loaded only one at a time, or have them in non-default location so your SSH client cannot find them.
SSH for remote batch operation /2

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if you have in `authorized_keys` command="/bin/df -h" ssh-dss AAAAB3N...
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SSH for X11 forwarding

SSH can forward X11 connections, so that you are not limited to command-line operation on the remote machine:

```
ssh -X -f jabberwock xterm
```

(-f to background ssh on command execution)

You can even have trusted X11 forwarding (ssh -XY) i.e. remote application having full access to local display. This is often needed to make applications actually work, but should be enabled with caution and only in controlled environments, since it is a significant security risk.
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SSH for tunneling

An incredibly powerful feature of SSH is port forwarding, that allows to connect local and remote ports through a secure channel, and can be used to connect to arbitrary remote services through a SSH gateway:

```
jabberwock$ ssh -f -L 10022:borg.hpc.sissa.it:22 calucci@shannon.sissa.it sleep 3600

jabberwock$ ssh -p 10022 root@localhost
The authenticity of host '[localhost]:10022 ([127.0.0.1]:10022)' can't be established. Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? yes
root@localhost's password:
root@borg #
```
SSH for tunneling

An incredibly powerful feature of SSH is port forwarding, that allows to connect local and remote ports through a secure channel, and can be used to connect to arbitrary remote services through a SSH gateway:

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NAT and Private Networks

While not Linux-specific, a powerful network security device is a NAT box that can «decouple» your internal network from the outside world.

- your internal network uses only non-routable addresses e.g. in the 10.0.0.0/8 range
- private addresses are fine for internal communications, but cannot be used on the Internet since packets would be dropped at the first router
- on the network perimeter there is a NAT box that translates private addresses to a (usually smaller) set of routable ones
- the translation is set up for the first outgoing packet, but there is no way an external unsolicited packet can have its destination address translated
- this way you can connect from inside to everywhere, but the reverse connection is not possible
NAT and security

NAT is sometimes presented as the ultimate network security solution. However, . . .

- it offers no protection at all from threats that involve an outgoing connection (e.g. downloaded malware)
- its effectiveness is greatly weakened on IPv6-enabled networks
- if the NAT box itself is compromised, it cannot protect your network any more

. . . so view it as another layer of security, but do not trust it as the only protection for your network.
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Online Resources

Security in General

Internet Storm Center  http://isc.sans.org/diary.html
SecurityFocus  http://www.securityfocus.com/
Linux Security  http://www.linuxsecurity.com/
the Honeynet Project  http://www.honeynet.org/papers/honeynet/
Online Resources /2

Applications

OpenSSH http://www.openssh.com/
AIDE http://sourceforge.net/projects/aide
ChkRootKit http://www.chkrootkit.org/
CrackLib http://sourceforge.net/projects/cracklib/
John the Ripper http://www.openwall.com/john/
SpamAssassin http://spamassassin.apache.org/
BogoFilter http://bogofilter.sourceforge.net/
Online Resources /3

Kernel-related

Linux VServer  http://www.linux-vserver.org/

VMware  http://www.vmware.com/

QEMU  http://fabrice.bellard.free.fr/qemu/

Xen  http://www.xensource.com/


AppArmor  http://www.novell.com/linux/security/apparmor/

grsecurity  http://www.grsecurity.net/

Netfilter  http://www.netfilter.org/
that's all folks!

<calucci@sissa.it>

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